The Law and Politics of Unjust Enrichment by Priel, Dan
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research Papers, Working Papers, ConferencePapers
Research Report No. 15/2013
The Law and Politics of Unjust Enrichment
Dan Priel
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, dpriel@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Priel, Dan, "The Law and Politics of Unjust Enrichment" (2013). Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy. Research Paper No.
15/2013.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/264
OSGOODE	  HALL	  LAW	  SCHOOL	  
Comparative	  Research	  in	  Law	  &	  Political	  Economy	  
RESEARCH	  PAPER	  SERIES	  
Research	  Paper	  No.	  15/2013	  
The	  Law	  and	  Politics	  of	  Unjust	  Enrichment	  
Dan	  Priel	  
Editors:	  
Peer	  Zumbansen	  (Osgoode	  Hall	  Law	  School,	  Toronto,	  Director	  Comparative	  
Research	  in	  Law	  and	  Political	  Economy)	  
John	  W.	  Cioffi	  (University	  of	  California	  at	  Riverside)	  
Leeanne	  Footman	  (Osgoode	  Hall	  Law	  School,	  Toronto,	  Production	  Editor)	  
THE LAW AND POLITICS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Dan Priel* 
Abstract. One of the marked differences between American private law and the private 
law of the rest of the common law world is the relative lack of interest in restitution in 
the former compared with the enthusiasm for the subject in the latter. It has recently 
been suggested that this difference has to do with the impact of legal realism on 
American law. It was realism’s disdain for doctrinal analysis, it is said, which explains why 
American scholars did not find the largely doctrinally-driven work on restitution very 
interesting. In this essay I reject this argument as it fails to explain why American 
scholars did not turn to non-doctrinal restitution scholarship in the same way they have 
in areas like contract or tort. I offer a different explanation instead, one that derives from 
the different understanding of the relationship between law and politics among 
(mainstream) American and Commonwealth lawyers. I argue that it is this difference 
that explains both why Commonwealth lawyers felt the need to develop restitution as a 
solution to outstanding problems in other areas of private law, and why American 
lawyers, in their different political tradition, had little need for restitution to perform this 
role. I further argue that legal realism does not explain the difference between the U.S. 
and the Commonwealth on this matter. On the contrary, I argue that the very different 
fates of legal realism in the U.S. and in other parts of the common law world are 
explained by the very same underlying differences between law and politics the essay 
identifies.  
For a reason which has never been fully explained, the Restatement and, in 
the next generation, the work of Professors Jack Dawson and George 
Palmer, failed to stir American lawyers and law schools to anything like the 





One of the striking differences between American and Commonwealth work 
on private law is the very different place accorded within them to the law of 
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 Peter Birks, The Foundations of Unjust Enrichment: Six Centennial Lectures 
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2002) at 18-19. 
2 
restitution (or unjust enrichment).2 In contrast to the Commonwealth where 
restitution is an area that attracts considerable scholarly attention, in the 
United States the subject is an academic backwater. Describing the 
American scene a few years ago John Langbein said that ‘[i]t is as though a 
neutron bomb has hit the field—the monuments have been left standing, 
but the people have been killed off.’3 Langbein’s explanation for this grim 
state of affairs puts the blame on the ‘terrible toll that the realist movement 
has inflicted on doctrinal study in post-Second World War USA.’4 More 
recently, Chaim Saiman has advanced essentially the same view: 
‘Commonwealth restitution discourse is largely a product of pre- or anti-
realist legal thought which generates scepticism from the mainstream 
2
 This first sentence already calls for three clarifications. First, while my main 
focus and examples throughout the essay will come from English law, I believe what 
I say applies to a certain degree to other Commonwealth jurisdictions. This is 
because the first impetus for developing this area of law in the Commonwealth came 
from English lawyers, and also because I think ideas about the relationship between 
law and politics in England have had considerable influence on the political tradition 
in the rest of the Commonwealth. Nonetheless, the fact that in recent years different 
Commonwealth jurisdictions have been carving their own path may be an indication 
of the decline even in these jurisdictions of the view that private law is a domain that 
exists outside politics. See the discussion in section II.(b) below. Second, the term 
private law, and the division between private and public law that it presupposes, is 
not neutral. In the United States in particular many would argue that in an 
important sense all law is public law. I use the term therefore only as shorthand for 
contract, tort, property, and restitution without committing myself to any 
substantive view on the question in what sense (if any) private law is private. Finally, 
whether restitution and unjust enrichment form a distinct area of law is a subject of 
considerable debate, which I intend to avoid here. I trust, however, that the terms 
restitution and unjust enrichment are familiar enough to identify the subject-matter 
I am concerned with in this essay.  
3
 John Langbein, ‘The Later History of Restitution’ in WR Cornish et al, eds, 
Restitution Past, Present, and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Oxford: 
Hart, 1998) 57 at 61. 
4
 Ibid at 62. Langbein adds another explanation that has to do with the rise of 
economic analysis of law. But in a way it is the same explanation, for the rise and 
success of economic analysis of law (as opposed to other interdisciplinary approaches 
to law) is the other side of the decline of doctrinal scholarship. I would contend that 
part of the success of economic analysis of law in the United States has to do with a 
perception (whether justified or not) among American academic lawyers that it 
could provide a degree of certainty that legal doctrine does not possess.  
3 
American academic establishment.’5 In essence, the view is that legal realism 
has led to the decline of respect for the sort of doctrinal analysis that has 
been the driving force behind restitution in English and Commonwealth law.  
This difference between American and English (and perhaps more 
broadly Commonwealth) legal scholarship is a familiar one,6 but as an 
explanation for the American lack of interest in restitution it suffers from a 
fundamental flaw: it is true that doctrinal scholarship in the United States is 
held in low regard, and it is thus not surprising why American legal scholars 
did not take much interest in the largely doctrinal scholarship that 
dominates academic work on restitution in the Commonwealth.7 But this, of 
course, is true of restitution just as much as it is true of contract law, tort law 
and many other areas of law which were once dominated by doctrinal 
scholarship in the United States. Yet, as even a cursory glance at American 
law journals reveals, there is wealth of new work in these areas of law, albeit 
much of it in the style that some Commonwealth scholars call (with a whiff 
of derision) ‘high theory.’ So to say that there is little restitution scholarship 
in the U.S. because restitution scholarship is doctrinal is to beg the real 
question, namely why there was no growth in non-doctrinal restitution 
scholarship in the United States that has come to dominate even traditional 
common law areas like contract and tort law.8  Langbein and Saiman’s 
5
 Chaim Saiman, ‘Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the 
Global Restitution Party’ (2008) 28 Oxford J Legal Stud 99 at 103. This explanation 
is accepted in Mitchell McInnes, ‘Resisting Temptations to “Justice”’ in Robert 
Chambers et al., eds, Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 100 at 127 [Philosophical Foundations]; 
Peter Birks, ‘Equity, Conscience, and Unjust Enrichment’ (1999) 23 Melb U L Rev 1 
at 3, n.6. 
6
 See PS Atiyah, ‘American Tort Law in Crisis’ (1987) 7 Oxford J Legal Stud 279 
at 280-04 and AWB Simpson, ‘Contract: The Twitching Corpse’ (1981) 1 Oxford J 
Legal Stud 265 at 269-71 (1981).  
7
 What counts as ‘doctrinal’ scholarship as opposed to ‘theory’ may itself be the 
subject of some contention. What is called ‘legal theory’ in Allan Beever & Charles 
Rickett, ‘Interpretive Legal Theory and the Academic Lawyer’ (2005) 68 Mod L Rev 
320, I consider doctrinal scholarship. As I see it, the difference is the degree to which 
the scholar feels compelled to base his arguments on an understanding of legal 
(especially judicial) materials. 
8
 In a different article Saiman added the ‘the lack of prestige of commercial law 
in America’ as another reason. Chaim Saiman, ‘Restitution and the Production of 
Legal Doctrine’ (2008) 65 Wash & Lee L Rev 993 at 1006; and similarly, Langbein 
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answer would convince only if for some reason restitution law somehow 
resisted non-doctrinal scholarship. Langbein actually comes close to 
suggesting this when he says that ‘[t]he study of restitution requires an 
environment that treats doctrine with respect.’9 Langbein does not explain 
why restitution is different from other areas of law, but on its face this claim 
seems odd. Hanoch Dagan’s self-consciously realist and largely American-
orientated work on restitution illustrates this does not have to be the case.10 
Langbein may have meant that by this statement that theoretical work on 
law can only emerge against a background of developed doctrine. I have my 
doubts about this view in general, as there are many examples of theoretical 
work on law that is developed directly against doctrine, or to fill gaps in 
doctrine, or is written with indifference to (or ignorance of) it. At any rate, in 
the case of unjust enrichment, the doctrinal foundation was there. As 
Langbein himself says, it was Americans who were the first in the common 
law world to start thinking about unjust enrichment in a doctrinally 
systematic way, and thanks to the efforts of a small group of scholars the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment has just been 
published.11 All along, drafts and discussions for this and the previous 
(unfinished) Restatement were published. These could have been grist to an 
talks about the ‘marginalisation of private law,’ in Langbein, supra note 3 at 61.  But, 
once again, it is not difficult to find articles on contract, tort, bankruptcy, securities 
regulation, corporate finance and other areas of private or commercial law in the 
leading American journals. 
9
 Ibid at 62. 
10
 See Hanoch Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) [Dagan, Restitution]; Hanoch Dagan, ‘Restitution’s Realism’ 
in Philosophical Foundations, supra note 5 at 54. Dagan is not alone. Though small in 
comparison to other branches of private law there has been other non-doctrinal work 
on restitution by American scholars such as Christopher Wonnell, ‘Replacing the 
Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment’ (1996) 45 Emory LJ 153; Saul Levmore, 
‘Explaining Restitution’ (1985) 71 Va L Rev 65; Richard A Epstein, ‘The Ubiquity of 
the Benefit Principle’ (1994) 67 S Cal L Rev 1369. I explain this scholarship in note 
90 and accompanying text below. 
11
 See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011). Now 
that it is there, we have been promised a ‘restitution revival.’ See Caprice L. Roberts, 
‘The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity’ (2011) 68 Wash & Lee L Rev 
1027 at 1027, but it turns out that this revival is, for the time being, only an 
expectation. See ibid at 1041.  
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aspiring scholar’s mill, and yet most American lawyers remained 
uninterested. 
Saiman attempted to explain this divide by telling us that ‘the amount of 
restitution law produced by a given [legal] system corresponds to the degree 
that restitutionary remedies are conceptualized as correlating to specific legal 
entitlements arising from property and contract. Hence, the less remedial 
discretion allotted to the courts, the greater the need for substantive law of 
restitution.’12 But this is like saying that the more restitution law is perceived 
to be needed, the more of it will get produced. The question remains: why do 
different legal systems have different perceived needs for such 
developments? And for that matter, why are American lawyers less troubled 
by remedial discretion? 
It is these questions that this essay seeks to address. The answer I 
propose for this puzzle has to do with the role unjust enrichment played in 
English and Commonwealth law. I will argue that, for various reasons that 
will be explained below, American academic lawyers had no need for unjust 
enrichment; to English lawyers, by contrast, restitution law provided a 
solution to otherwise intractable problems. To understand why this was the 
case we need to look into a matter that seems to bear no relationship to the 
question at hand, namely the way American law and English law conceive of 
the relationship between law and politics. I argue that this difference leads to 
distinct ways of understanding the shape and limits of acceptable doctrinal 
innovation in the two legal systems. It is these differences, I will argue, that 
provide a more satisfying explanation for the trajectories restitution law and 
restitution scholarship took in these two countries.  
If I am right about this, then this claim has broader significance than the 
rather narrow point from which it emerges. In the familiar distinctions of 
legal traditions American law is often classified with the rest of the law of the 
English-speaking former British colonies as belonging to the ‘common law’ 
family. In some respects this classification is, of course, unobjectionable. But 
it is no secret that in some respects American law has taken a different path 
from the rest of the common law. Especially in the area of private law, 
Commonwealth lawyers, both academic and practicing, seem to implicitly 
accept this parting of ways by showing less interest in American court 
decisions, which (despite their much larger number) are much less 
frequently cited or analyzed in Commonwealth textbooks than the decisions 
from other Commonwealth jurisdictions; American legal scholarship in these 
12






areas is also, with a few exceptions, largely ignored. The essay seeks to 
provide part of an answer as to why. Interestingly, what emerges from it is 
that at least in this area, the familiar common law/civil law divide (one that 
some English doctrinal scholars rely on in seeking to restrict the influence or 
borrowings from other European legal systems) is misleading. In some 
important respects, English law is now much closer to European civil law 
than to American law. 
One caveat: my account attempts to explain the different fates of 
restitution in English and American law as, in part, resulting from different 
fundamental perceptions of the relationship between law and politics. These 
differences are most visible from a certain distance; move closer and all 
patterns disappear, move away and differences vanish. No doubt one could 
find representatives of what I describe as the typical English approach on the 
American side, and vice versa; in fact, later in this essay I extend my 
explanation to account for some of the debates among English restitution 
lawyers. Nevertheless, I believe that the patterns I describe reflect are real, 
and that they are crucial for understanding the different fates of restitution 
in the two countries.  
Here is how my argument will unfold. I start with briefly presenting a 
sketch of the significance of ideas to legal thought, and will explain how this 
perspective helps in understanding the sort of explanation I will be offering 
here. In section II I explain the problem that restitution was meant to solve 
in English law. I argue that restitution was the means for solving existing 
problems that doctrine within other areas of law proved incapable of solving. 
This answer, however, raises an immediate question: why was there a need to 
develop these solutions outside these particular areas of law, instead of 
correcting the problems in existing doctrine? Section III begins to answer 
this question by discussing an issue that looks at first far removed from 
doctrinal problems in private law, namely the way in which different legal 
systems conceptualize the relationship between law and politics. I argue 
there that certain ways of understanding this relationship constrain the sorts 
of answers available within English doctrine. In section IV I apply this 
distinction to the question and restitution and show how it explains the 
different fate of restitution in English and American law, both at the 






I. The Power of Ideas 
The familiar version of the modern history of unjust enrichment in English 
law has the individual efforts of Robert Goff and Gareth Jones, of Peter Birks, 
and perhaps a few others scholars, as major turning points in changing an 
area of law that many doubted even existed into the most active area for new 
doctrinal scholarship. In this story, had it not been for the perseverance of 
these authors, English restitution law might have looked quite different 
today, as powerful voices were opposed to the addition of restitution (or 
unjust enrichment) to the list of recognized legal categories. Though in part 
true (and significant), this account is in many respects an example of the 
fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. We know what happened, and so we tell 
the story as though it was bound to happen. But compare this story to a 
different one: In the late 1970s a group of scholars tried to import the then 
emerging ideas of law and economics into English legal scholarship. These 
studies were published in all the leading English journals, but what turned 
into a flood in the U.S. has had virtually no impact on English law. Had 
economic analysis caught on in Britain, no doubt these articles would have 
been hailed now as early precursors of what became a major development. As 
there was no such development, there is no story to tell. The very different 
fates of restitution and economic analysis show that we need to look 
elsewhere for the missing ingredient in our story, the one that explains why 
certain ideas have impact while others do not.  
The same question arises closer to our subject: had restitution been a 
success in the United States, William Keener, the author of the first English-
language treatise on the subject, and even more so Austin Scott and Warren 
Seavey, the reporters of the 1937 Restatement of Restitution, would have 
been considered visionary path-breakers, minor heroes in the pantheon of 
American law. But as restitution languished at the dark corners of American 
law and their work was neglected, the names of Keener, Scott and Seavey 
have been forgotten. They are now familiar only to the small coterie of 
scholars who keep the feeble flame of American restitution law alive. It is not 
enough, then, to show that new ideas started with someone. They always do. 
The question is what makes certain ideas stick. The rest of the essay 
attempts to explain what that extra ingredient is in the context of 
restitution. 
Before I turn to that question, I must preface my account with a short 
explanation of a more general kind. Legal systems are not just the sum of 






what might be called the ‘ideology’ of the legal system. I use the term 
ideology in a non-pejorative sense, and it is not limited to (although it 
includes) the political orientation of the legal system to non-legal ideas: 
different legal systems can both be politically ‘liberal’ and yet have a very 
different ideology in other regards. Thus, ideology will include attitudes 
regarding the openness of the legal system, the role of courts and lawyers in 
the legal system, the relative weight a given legal system tends to give to 
certainty over other considerations, and so on. This ideology will affect 
foundational questions, such as the appropriate issues for the legal system to 
deal with and the appropriate ways of dealing with them, as well as more 
mundane issues like the appropriate methods for interpreting legal materials, 
the amount of deference that should be given to other branches of 
government and so on.13 This is why legal ideology is both powerful but easy 
to miss. As the ideology of a legal system is part of the background of all the 
law, it is easy to overlook how contingent it is and to treat local attitudes as 
part of the order of the world. And because in one way or another it affects 
all aspects of a legal system, it is often very difficult to change.  
This has important implications for understanding the limits of legal 
change. It is because of the ideological component of legal systems that good 
norms from other legal systems often do not travel well between 
jurisdictions. Ignoring ideology, a lawmaker seeking to improve the laws of 
her jurisdiction could simply look for those norms best supported by reason, 
or to ideas coming from any existing or imaginary jurisdiction, and all will be 
equally good candidates for importation. In reality, this is not often the case. 
New legal ideas have staying power to the extent that they can be made to fit 
within the existing ideology of a legal system. What this means is that they 
will be treated as valuable when they are perceived to offer adequate solutions 
to (what are taken to be) open problems. Ideas that satisfy only one of these 
two conditions are likely to be considered (at best) interesting for ‘academic’ 
discussion but irrelevant in practice.  
Once a solution is incorporated in a legal system, it becomes part of the 
background against which new ideas and new solutions to other problems are 
assessed. Because new ideas are incorporated to the extent that they fit the 
existing legal ideology, quite often legal change will operate through a kind of 
feedback loop mechanism that tends to deepen the ideological path to which 
a legal system is already committed. It is through this mechanism that initial 
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 C.f. Anthony Ogus, ‘The Economic Basis of Legal Culture: Networks and 






small differences between legal systems can become more pronounced with 
time until at a certain point meaningful exchange of ideas between the legal 
systems becomes difficult.14 Just as the geographical separation of two groups 
belonging to a single species can lead to speciation, the separation of legal 
systems can lead to legal system speciation. Because the reshaping and 
changing of legal systems happens through conscious efforts rather than 
random change, reversing course is easier in the domain of legal ideas than in 
the biological world, but it is noteworthy that when such efforts at reversing 
courses are made, the change is often accompanied by efforts to expose, or 
invent (the two are not always easily distinguished), a shared origin.15  
In what follows I will try to demonstrate that it is the ideology of English 
and American law, and in particular their fundamental, and fundamentally 
different, attitudes to the relationship between law and politics, that explain 
the different fates of restitution law in these countries.  
II. Unjust Enrichment as the Solution to the Problem of 
Unjust Doctrine 
Since much of the Commonwealth doctrinal scholarship on unjust 
enrichment has been in one way or another a development of, or a reaction 
to, the work of Peter Birks it would be helpful to start with him. Birks was the 
first to admit that many of his most fundamental ideas about law in general 
and restitution law in particular were derived from Roman law. What made 
his ideas so influential, however, was that he did not develop these ideas 
within the niche area of Roman law scholarship. Rather, for the most part he 
translated them to concepts that made them comprehensible to the English 
common lawyer. He argued that these ideas could provide doctrinally 
                                                     
14
 More precisely, when ideological differences between legal systems are initially 
small, unequal access to new ideas which reinforce the existing differences can result 
in the legal systems drifting away from each other. Geography, language, and 
political ties have traditionally been the source of unequal access to new ideas. 
Globalization and technology may overcome some of these barriers, but not 
necessarily others. At the same time, they may exacerbate the problem of 
information glut that often leads to discrimination in favour of more local or more 
similar ideas. There is, of course, much more to be said about these issues. 
15
 In the European context see Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law, 
Contemporary Law, European Law: The Civilian Tradition Today (Oxford: Oxford 






respectable solutions to existing legal problems in English law. Though he 
never wrote a treatise on restitution, his work followed a path that was 
familiar to contemporary English private lawyers: it was based on ‘look[ing] 
downwards to the cases,’16 and was conceived as a non-political investigation 
into ‘lawyers’ law.’  
These methodological commitments led to two substantive principles 
that were at the heart of Birks’s thinking on unjust enrichment. The first was 
that unjust enrichment is a member in full standing of the law obligations 
alongside contract and tort. By this what Birks meant was not merely that 
unjust enrichment law was a useful way of organizing material for 
pedagogical or explanatory purposes, but that unjust enrichment represented 
a fundamental legal category, one that corresponded to the real divisions of 
the law.17 The second commitment was that unjust enrichment, despite its 
name, has relatively little to do with justice. Birks could not have put this 
point more strongly than he did: with almost no loss of meaning, Birks tells 
us, ‘unjust enrichment’ could be called ‘pink enrichment.’18 
I wish to present a picture that challenges both points. I believe there are 
no true legal categories over and above the categories we create. The way 
courts classify cases may, for certain purposes, be a useful way of classifying 
them. But in other instances different classifications can be more useful. 
There is nothing wrong with classifying the topic of vitiated contracts within 
contract law, or that of gain-based remedies for wrongs under tort law; there 
                                                     
16
 Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, paperback ed (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989) at 23; see also ibid at 99. 
17
 See generally Peter Birks, ‘Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical 
Truths’ [1997] NZ L Rev 623; see also Nicholas J McBride, ‘The Classification of 
Obligations and Legal Education’ in Peter Birks, ed, The Classification of Obligations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 71; McInnes, supra note 5 at 101, 114 (complaining 
about the principles of the law of restitution being ‘manipulated’ or ‘abused’). 
Saiman also seems to hold the same view when he complains that ‘[l]acking a 
formalized “law of restitution” cases of mistaken payment were analyzed ‘through 
the eyes of tort and contract.’ Chaim Saiman, ‘Restating Restitution: A Case of 
Contemporary Common Law Conceptualism’ (2007) 52 Vill L Rev 487 at 524. But 
this is a mistake only if one believes that legal categories reflect some real, 
conceptual truths. 
18
 See Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005) 
at 274-75; Birks, supra note 16 at 19-23. Others expressed similar views. See Andrew 
Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 4, 






is also nothing wrong with classifying them for different purposes as part of 
the law of restitution. Legal scholars do not discover categories that are true, 
but rather articulate categories that are useful. Of course some categories 
may be more useful than others, but even here, the useful classifications for a 
lawyer representing a hospital may be very different from those useful for a 
university lecturer.19  
The second point is that contrary to the view that unjust enrichment has 
little to do with justice, I contend that a main reason why restitution law 
flourished in English law is because it provided a doctrinally respectable way 
of avoiding what were perceived to be unjust results in other areas of law. It 
is for this reason that restitution law looks so much like the result of a looting 
campaign in other legal categories: a bit from contract, a chunk from tort, 
something from property with a dash of equity. A couple of examples will 
help substantiate this point. Consider, first, the simple, ‘core case’ of unjust 
enrichment, mistaken payment.20 Why does this case require legal 
intervention? The answer must include two elements. The first is that the 
outcome where the recipient retains the money is deemed ‘wrong.’ By wrong 
I do not mean, of course, legally wrong; I mean a situation that is in some 
inarticulate sense morally problematic. Now, there can be all kinds of 
elaborate theories—having to do with autonomy, self-determination, 
economic efficiency, fairness—to explain why such a situation in which the 
payee retains the mistaken payment is ‘wrong,’ and these different 
explanations may lead to real differences in certain contexts, but Birks 
presents this case as an axiom, one that requires no explanation and cannot 
be questioned.  
Assume he is right in treating this is a core case. The question for the 
lawyer then is how the law should deal with these kinds of situation. Unjust 
enrichment scholars have argued that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is 
necessary for handling such cases, but it is not immediately clear why. It is 
obvious that ownership is not always matched by possession, and that there is 
nothing wrong with that: books could not be lent and houses could not be 
rented if that were not the case. But such separation of ownership from 
                                                     
19
 It may be due to humans’ internal wiring certain legal divisions will appear to 
most or even all humans as more ‘natural.’ Showing this, however, will require appeal 
to pre-legal psychological categories, not to the ‘internal’ coherence of certain legal 
categories. 
20
 The designation of this as the core case of unjust enrichment is in Birks, supra 






possession usually requires a voluntary act on part of the owner; when such a 
voluntary act is not present, then (typically) the owner has a claim for 
retaining possession quite simply as one of the ‘incidents of ownership.’21 
The basic idea invoked here—’This is mine! Give it back to me’—is so 
simple that toddlers begin to grasp it when they are about fourteen months 
old.22 Therefore, a possible way of handing cases of mislaid, forgotten, and 
mistakenly-given property is by appealing to this simple idea, something that 
even the most enthusiastic supporters of unjust enrichment admit.23  
Why then is unjust enrichment invoked in the case of mistaken 
payment? The reason is certain complications introduced by the law: there 
are situations in which title passes despite the fact that the conditions we 
commonly think of as the reasons for the transfer of property (e.g., voluntary 
action) have not been met. This mismatch between our intuitive ideas of 
property and the requirements of property law is deemed by us to be unjust, 
not (merely) in the legal sense of invoking a restitutionary claim, but in the 
everyday meaning of the term: it is considered morally problematic, it is 
considered ‘wrong.’ For whatever reason, many people think that 
absentmindedness should not normally suffice for losing one’s property 
regardless of niceties about legal title. When this point is recognized, it is 
natural to go back to the very same proprietary ideas that were relied upon 
before. What explains the doctrine here, what distinguishes cases in which 
                                                     
21
 See Tony Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and 
Philosophical  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 161 at 167 (‘The owner … has 
characteristically a battery of remedies in order to obtain, keep, and if necessary get 
back the thing owed [to him],’ which include ‘the claim for specific restitution of 
goods, and the vindication’). 
22
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the payment should be returned from cases (such as those involving gifts) in 
which it should not, has to do with our underlying ideas of property. In the 
case of a mistaken payment there was no conscious, willed decision to give 
the money to another; in the case of a cash gift, there was. And so even in 
these cases, ‘where unjust enrichment is most needed,’24 it turns out that 
unjust enrichment does not explain the law’s treatment of mistaken 
payment. If asked to describe this situation we would say ‘the money in 
question did not really belong to the payee, and therefore if she retained it 
should be unjustly enriched,’ not the other way around.  
My other example is briefer and more specific. It is the problem known 
as battle of the forms. In such a case what typically happens is that two 
parties try to contract by exchanging their standard form contracts. One 
party sends its own form, to which the other replies with its form. 
Performance then begins without the second form being formally accepted. 
The problem arises when the latter form is different in some important 
elements from the first one. Traditional offer-and-acceptance analysis 
classifies the second form as a rejection of the original offer and a new 
counteroffer that was never accepted. In most cases matters proceed without 
a hitch, but, obviously, sometimes they do not. What is to be done in such 
cases? When a case like this reached the English Court of Appeal the bold 
spirit of Lord Denning had no difficulty in asserting that the ‘traditional 
analysis … is out of date,’25 and he had no qualms about departing from it. 
The other judges agreed with him on the result, but they sought to do so by 
maintaining the traditional rules. What is interesting and important for the 
argument I will develop below is that in England there was academic support 
for the view that the right way to solve this problem is by appeal to 
restitution.26 Though the issue is different, the structure of the argument is 
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the same: we have a legal doctrine that leads to what is perceived as a 
problematic result, and unjust enrichment is invoked to solve the problem.  
Limits of space preclude me from offering other examples, but I believe 
that for virtually every case in which unjust enrichment has been invoked as 
justification, a similar story could be told: a problem with a doctrine in some 
area of law, and appeal to the ‘principle against unjust enrichment’ to solve 
it.27 
III. The Political Foundations of Doctrinal Scholarship 
The last section considered some of the cases that doctrinal lawyers say 
belong to the law of unjust enrichment in order to show that the doctrine 
was used to circumvent unjust results created by other doctrines. This claim, 
however, raises an immediate problem: if this is indeed the case, why was 
there a need for invoking unjust enrichment? It would have been easier to 
simply change the existing problematic doctrine instead of adding a further 
doctrinal layer in the shape of restitution law. Why have scholars opted for 
complex and circuitous solutions based on the vague idea of unjust 
enrichment when easier routes were available? The doctrinal answer offered 
to such a challenge is that ‘it is trite law that in a situation like this property 
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passes to the payee.’28 But this does not explain why restitution is needed: all 
law, even trite law, can be changed.29 
I have already described in general terms what I take the right answer to 
be: the solutions adopted had to be perceived as adequate solution to an open 
problem, and for reasons that I will try to explain below unjust enrichment 
appeared an adequate solution whereas changing existing legal doctrine did 
not. This at first may seem odd. If there is something that common lawyers 
pride themselves (and their legal tradition) on, it is their pragmatism and 
flexibility, and their dislike for excessive (‘German’) conceptualism.30 Against 
this background the rigid attitude suggested here may appear at first quite 
surprising. What could explain it?  
There is what might be called the ‘sinister’ answer, offered by Jeremy 
Bentham and reiterated later by many others: lawyers adopt complex rules 
because it is in their interest to make sure that their services are needed. I 
have no doubt that there are cases to which Bentham’s idea is applicable, but 
I think this case is not one of them, not least because the concern with 
restitution has, at least until recently, largely been an academic affair which 
actually had little impact on legal practice.31 Furthermore, this argument 
cannot explain the difference between English and American law on the 
matter. Therefore, I wish to suggest a different explanation, and that is that a 
different understanding of the relationship between law and politics in these 
two legal systems has led to very different views on the limits on acceptable 
legal change. More specifically, my argument will be that in some important 
sense the simple solutions offered above are unavailable to English lawyers, 
because they would be considered in some sense political, and as such not 
legal and therefore inadequate. This view depends on a particular 
understanding of the relationship between law and politics, one according to 
which the two domains are largely separate and therefore some possible 
solutions to legal problems are not solutions that lawyers can properly 
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suggest. By contrast, in the United States, where the prevailing view on the 
relationship between law and politics is fundamentally different, there was 
no similar barrier to adopting the simpler solutions.  
(a) Two Views on the Relationship between Law and Politics 
My central argument is that English law and American law have a different 
ideology on the question of the relationship between law and politics. Now if 
by politics we mean questions concerning the distribution of resources in 
society, then few will doubt that law, even private law, is in some sense tied 
to politics. In another sense, there seems to be general agreement that all 
law, including public law, is separate from politics. All judges, for example, 
insist that in deciding cases, they are following the law, not their personal 
political opinions; and all agree that in some sense law is undermined when it 
is infiltrated by politics.  
And yet there is an intuitive sense in which American courts are touched 
by politics in a way that judges in the Commonwealth are not. Throughout 
American history courts have often been asked to decide on politically 
controversial questions (such as slavery, abortion, health care, same-sex 
marriage). There is also a burgeoning academic industry, frequently 
discussed also in the press, that analyzes court decisions according to the 
judges’ perceived political orientation. In the Commonwealth, to varying 
degrees, the courts do not play that role, and it is much rarer to consider 
judges’ open in openly political terms.  
This difference has its roots, in part, in the different political traditions 
of England (and through it the rest of the Commonwealth) and the U.S, and 
the relative role of law in political debates.32 One of the most distinctive 
marks of American law and scholarship of the last century has been attempts 
to spell out ways by which American courts could somehow be able to police 
and limit political discourse without entering into the forbidden territory of 
politics. Various ‘theories’ of judicial review were concerned with 
demarcating a proper role for courts when deciding on politically 
controversial cases. The search for ‘neutral principles,’ the distinction 
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between principles and policies, the limitation of judicial review to 
infringements on the right to participate in the democratic process are all 
examples of this attempt. Similarly, the emergence of distinct ‘theories’ of 
statutory and constitutional interpretation were to a large extent a response 
to the need to keep law outside politics while dealing with and deciding on 
politically controversial matters.33 The hallmark of the American approach—
regardless of the very different solution proposed—has been the attempt to 
develop doctrinal and institutional tools for allowing courts some 
engagement with political discourse without getting embroiled in political 
debates.  
It is no coincidence that all these debates have had, especially until 
recent years, very little resonance in the rest of the common law world. The 
simple reason is that there was no need for them, because the English (and 
Commonwealth) approach to the challenge of politics has been quite 
different. The prevailing view here has been that law is the antithesis of 
politics, and therefore maintaining the distinction between law and politics 
requires identifying the two distinct domains of law and politics and keeping 
them, as much as possible, separate.34 Dicey’s influential interpretation of 
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Parliamentary supremacy has been taken to mean that beyond relatively 
undemanding tests of legal warrant, courts did not interfere with political 
decisions. Instead of devising complicated means for distinguishing 
permissible from impermissible engagements with politics, the mainstream 
view has been that the only approach that maintains democratic values and 
that guarantees the legitimacy of courts, is that they altogether avoid 
politically controversial questions.  
A further means for keeping law separate from politics has been an 
invigorated distinction between private law and public law. This distinction 
was not traditionally central to the common law. Indeed, the belief that there 
was no such distinction in English law was at one point considered a central 
distinction between the common law and civil law traditions (as well as a 
barely concealed basis for pride in the superiority of the common law).35 But 
in recent years, perhaps as a result of a sense that politics was increasingly 
intertwined in public law, the divide between public law and private law has 
emerged as a fundamental category of Commonwealth common law. Part of 
the motivation for separating private law from public law has been the view 
that private law is, necessarily, non-political.36 On this view law, or at least 
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private law, is corrupted when its rules are subjected to politics.37 A clinically 
clean statement of this view is found in Ernest Weinrib’s provocative 
suggestion that ‘the purpose of private law is simply to be private law.’38  
To a lawyer seriously committed to this view, these words are not just a 
slogan. One of their practical implications is that they impose a limit on the 
permissible sources the lawyer should consult in her work. It is not simply 
that looking at the work of economists or philosophers is unnecessary for 
understanding and developing the law; for a proponent of this view, in an 
important sense it is wrong to do, for it is within the law that one need and 
should look for determining the content of legal change and it is legal 
materials that determine its acceptable limits. Another important aspect of 
this view is that private law is the domain of expert lawyers and should 
largely be left outside democratic decision-making. It should not be 
legislated (for proponents of this view, the epitome of politics),39 and to the 
extent that it is legislatively changed, the change should be the result of work 
from a non-political (and doctrinal-lawyer-dominated) Law Commission.40  
The most important practical implication of this view for our purposes is 
that legal change is considered a different kind of beast from political change 
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of the law. Whereas the latter is (especially within the British system) in 
principle still largely unconstrained by law, the former is governed by rules on 
what count as ‘permissible’ moves. To use a word much favoured by 
proponents of the former view, legal change must have a certain form. These 
impose some limits on the outcomes one can reach, but they also impose 
less-discussed limits on the way to get to them.  
This does not yet explain the difference between legal and political 
change. Isn’t it obvious that change in the law must be grounded in some 
normative idea, and as such must be grounded in political arguments? To 
proponents of the model of law and politics discussed here the answer is ‘no’: 
to maintain the idea of law as an autonomous discipline it must be that legal 
change—one based on the law’s own ‘self-understanding,’ on its own 
resources—be different from change based on any other discipline. One of 
the most familiar ways in which this idea is articulated is in the distinction 
courts always make between the kind of changes in the law they can bring 
about and the change that can only be brought about by the legislature. It is 
often thought that such explanations are based on the worry that the courts 
will overstep into the legitimate domain of an elected Parliament, that is, 
that they will violate democratic legitimacy. And though this is true, quite 
often the focus of the explanation is subtly but importantly different: such 
unacceptable change is problematic because it requires stepping outside the 
legitimate powers of courts. These are not two sides of the same coin. It is 
not simply that the power of legal change by the courts ends where that of 
the legislature begins; on this view there are independent considerations, 
having to do with the nature of (private) law, that limit courts’ permissible 
action that have little to do with democracy. 
The fundamental difference between the two has to do with the 
difference between acts of will and arguments of reason.41 Political change—
because it derives its authority from democratic principles—is the domain of 
acts of will; by contrast, legal change—because its authority can come on this 
view only from within the law itself—is acceptable only if it comes from a 
reinterpretation of legal materials. As such, on this view legal change is 
acceptable only if in some sense it does not change the law at all. A politician 
seeking to change the law can simply declare: ‘the law will be better if we 
change it in this way.’ Odd as it may sound, from the perspective considered 
here this simple and seemingly obvious line of argument is not available to 
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the lawyer, because what counts as ‘better’ is a political question, something 
on which people of different political persuasions will hold different views. 
This is why the lawyer must resort to a different kind of argument, one 
compelled by the legal materials themselves. Even when reaching the same 
outcome (and for that matter, even if the lawyer happens to share the view 
with the politician that the outcome would be ‘better’), this can never be a 
reason for the decision. 
In theory at least the difference between the two approaches is vast,42 
and it explains some fundamental aspects of doctrinal legal practice. This, 
for example, is the foundation of the old idea—to which one finds support 
among doctrinal lawyers even today—that judges and lawyers never change 
the law, only discover it.43 Even when not adopting such a view, the idea of 
abolishing a doctrine is treated with suspicion, for in some sense it is not an 
acceptable move in the ‘game,’ it suggests a kind of breakdown of the rules. 
It is perhaps for this reason that the most natural (perhaps the only available) 
route for doing that is by arguing that the decision being overruled was 
‘wrongly decided’ in the sense that it could not have been reached on any 
reasonable interpretation of existing legal materials at the time it was handed 
down.44 Doing that makes it possible to ‘return’ the law from the wrong path 
it has taken to the true course it should always have taken, thereby seemingly 
not changing the law. 
I need less space to describe the mainstream view among American 
lawyers, because it is quite simply more-or-less the opposite. The starting 
point for debate among American lawyers is that in an important sense law is 
part of politics. Law is a means for achieving political ends, law can be used 
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to pursue political ends, and legal institutions are forum of political debate. 
This is clearly the case in contentious, highly visible constitutional cases, but 
it is also the case in ‘private’ law cases. It reflects a philosophy that rejects the 
divide between reason and will and conceives all of it as having its source in 
the will of the lawmakers.45 Underneath this rather abstract idea one finds a 
whole range of different views running the gamut from the view that law is 
politics with an odd jargon to the view that law is a kind of idealized politics. 
But the view that law is separate or autonomous from politics is, for the most 
part, treated as not just wrong, but naïve and even dangerous.  
Because law in the U.S. is understood in more overtly political terms, 
legal change, including the abolition of existing doctrines, is easier to explain 
in more direct terms: if the law no longer serves whatever goal is set for it, it 
should be changed. Of course, even within this approach courts operate 
under various constraints, and judges do not simply decide cases any way 
they want. The difference is, however, that within this approach the limits of 
legal argument and legal change are thought to be determined on the basis of 
political or institutional analysis, not on the basis of a fixed conceptual 
division between law and politics. True, even in American law there are those 
who call for greater ‘formalism’ (for our purposes, greater separation between 
law and politics) but unlike the conceptual approach, these calls typically 
invoke explicitly political or institutional arguments in support of their 
position.46  
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(b) An Illustration: The Universality of the Common Law 
When the fundamental difference in English and American law’s 
conceptualization of the relationship between law and politics is brought to 
light many of the differences between the two legal systems become clearer. 
Some of the differences, such as English courts’ greater reluctance to enter 
into issues that are politically contested, are in plain view;47 some, like 
English courts’ greater adherence to precedent, go slightly deeper.48 Some go 
deeper still: the issues that preoccupy legal debates, the very different style of 
legal scholarship, the views regarding the relationship between the common 
law and statute law, even the dominant jurisprudential theories. The 
differences also have implications beyond the strict limits of legal doctrine; I 
believe, for example, that the different approaches to legal education in the 
two countries are, at least in part, explicable by this fundamental 
distinction.49 
Here I wish to highlight a less familiar issue explained by the different 
attitude towards law and politics, namely the attitude toward the universality 
of the common law. This difference is particularly relevant in the context of 
restitution because much of the doctrinal work on unjust enrichment has 
been a joint effort of scholars from all over the Commonwealth. This is no 
coincidence. A fundamental idea that underlies, often quite explicitly, much 
of the work of doctrinal scholars is that the common law is some kind of 
single unified system, such that solutions reached in one legal system should 
be largely the same as those in others.50 This is not treated merely as a 
reflection of common historical origin, but as a fact of normative significance 
such that divergences between common law jurisdictions are thought to be a 
cause for concern in a way that, say, differences between English and French 
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law are not.51 This practice, importantly, is not the result of the ease of access 
to judicial decisions in English, because American court decisions (and 
American legal scholarship) are treated differently from decisions from the 
rest of the English-speaking world. Likewise, divergences between English 
law and American law are not considered a cause for alarm in the way that 
divergences between English and Australian or Canadian courts are.52 From 
the other direction, American courts do not usually care about legal 
developments in common law jurisdictions outside the U.S, and most 
American legal academics are similarly uninterested in non-U.S. law and 
legal scholarship.  
The political significance of all this has not been fully appreciated. For 
the doctrinal scholar the experiences of other common law jurisdictions do 
not merely provide a host of examples and ideas. Rather, the common law is 
in some deep sense a single legal system that adheres to the same principles. 
And this conception of transnational common law is significant because it 
provides support to the idea of the common law as non-political. The 
Commonwealth countries are spread all over the globe and despite shared 
historical origins, they are now independent political entities. If their 
common law is common, this can only be because that law is governed by a 
set of autonomous rules that transcend politics. This is the exact corollary of 
the Birksian view that there are some correct principles of unjust enrichment 
that common law courts and commentators are working together to identify. 
Appealing to the law of another country is illegitimate abdication of 
sovereignty if laws are a reflection of a political view; if, on the other hand, 
law is perceived as a matter of expertise achieved through the elucidation 
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and refinement of law’s autonomous principles, then such worries are 
misplaced. For proponents of this view the combined efforts of judges and 
lawyers in these jurisdictions are the proof, and the guarantee, that private 
law remains distinct from politics.  
This attitude explains both why Commonwealth lawyers find American 
law a less appropriate source for citation, and why Americans, in turn, are 
reluctant to cite the cases of other jurisdictions. From the Commonwealth 
lawyer’s perspective American decisions are less ‘eligible’ for citation exactly 
because law in the U.S. is more self-consciously political. As such it is 
difficult to see it as belonging to the same ideal of non-political law.53 Thus, 
while the citation of an Australian decision by an English court in some sense 
strengthens the sense of law as a non-political domain, the citation of 
American decisions has the opposite effect by tainting the non-political 
purity of Commonwealth common law.  
For their part, American lawyers are much less willing to look to other 
jurisdictions for inspiration or ideas. This reluctance is found across the 
board: contract and tort are no different from constitutional or 
administrative law; and common law jurisdictions are no different in this 
regard from civil law jurisdictions. If all law is in some sense the product of 
politics and the means for promoting political ends, then reliance on the law 
of another country is prima facie illegitimate. Already in The Federalist 
Papers James Madison wrote that ‘neither the common nor the statute law of 
[England], or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for proceedings of 
this [nation], unless previously made its own by legislative adoption,’54 that is 
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unless it has been accepted in a process that guarantees its political 
legitimacy. Consequently, law should reflect the political values and culture 
of the jurisdiction in which it was created.55 Indeed, even when agreeing on 
substantive outcomes with some other jurisdiction, the idea that American 
lawyers should aim to align their law with that of countries, or that they have 
some cause for concern if it does not, would strike many of them as 
preposterous.56 
IV. The Effects of the Relationship between Law and 
Politics on Restitution Law and Scholarship 
The last section has taken us very far afield. It is time to go back to the 
discussion with which we started. Recall that we were trying to explain two 
questions, not just one: first, why restitution law does not play a significant 
role in American law; and second, why American scholars did not develop 
much theoretical work on restitution along the lines of the scholarship that 
now dominates American work on tort or contract law. I hope that at least 
the outlines of the answer should by now be reasonably clear. In sections (a) 
and (b) I discuss it in more detail and explain in what ways it is different 
from the answer given by Saiman and Langbein. Sections (c) and (d) explain 
two additional puzzles: first, I consider those issues on which one does find 
some work on restitution by American scholars and explain why 
Commonwealth doctrinal scholars have been largely silent or dismissive 
                                                                                                                                 
scientific approach to law.  See Gordon S Wood, The Radicalism of the American 
Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1993) at 322-24, who describes the ‘most dramatic 
institutional transformation in the early Republic,’ where ‘law became more and 
more of a science removed from politics.’ During this period English and American 
law were thought very similar. See e.g. AV Dicey, ‘A Common Citizenship for the 
English Race’ (1897) 71 Contemporary Rev 457 at 469-71. Erie Railroad, supra note 
45, is a useful signpost for the re-emergence of earlier approach.  
55
 See e.g. Richard A Posner, How Judges Think (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2008) at 351-52 (‘To cite foreign law as authority is to suppose fantastically 
that the world’s judges constitute a single community of wisdom and consciences’); 
John O McGinnis, ‘Foreign to Our Constitution’ (2006) 100 Nw. U L Rev 303 at 
311-12, 327-28. 
56
 So much so that at the time of writing legislators in ‘more than two dozen 
states have considered measures’ banning judges from consulting ‘Shariah, or foreign 
and religious laws more generally.’ Andrea Elliott, ‘The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah 






about them; and second, I offer an explanation of existing debates among 
restitution scholars in the Commonwealth, which are often presented as 
competing attempts to explain the ‘nature’ of restitution, but which I believe 
are better understood as reflecting different views on the relationship 
between law and politics.  
(a) Explaining the Difference between American and English 
Attitudes to Restitution 
With some simplification the view I associated with English law can be 
summarized syllogistically as follows: 
(1) Law and politics, properly understood, are mutually exclusive. 
(2) Therefore a political answer to a problem is, by definition, not a 
legal one.  
(3) Abolition of entrenched doctrines is a political kind of change. 
(4) Therefore it is one that only the legislature can bring about. 
(5) Therefore, it is one that is unavailable to the lawyer. 
 
This forms part of the worldview, or what I called earlier the ideology of the 
English legal system, against which restitution lawyers were working. 
Nonetheless, faced with situations where existing legal categories resulted in 
outcomes that were deemed unjust but based on ‘trite law’ that seemed 
beyond change, a legal solution was sometimes felt to be needed. Restitution 
provided the answer, and it proved particularly useful because it has at its 
core an element that allows for its unlimited expansion. The most important 
element within the unjust enrichment model is that of an ‘unjust factor.’ A 
successful plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant’s enrichment at 
her expense falls under of several recognized unjust factors or else her claim 
will fail. The list is made up of a hodgepodge of considerations that have 
little in common especially once we account for the so-called ‘policy-
motivated’ unjust factors.57 Within the alternative civilian analysis 
(embraced by Birks shortly before he died) and favoured in certain 
Commonwealth jurisdictions (most prominently Canada), what needs to be 
shown is lack of legal basis, a notion that is equally open-ended.58  
Thus, the very feature that makes unjust enrichment attractive—its 
ability to keep the law in line with common sense morality—is what makes it 
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a potential threat to the entire doctrinal edifice, and the separation of law 
from politics. One sees this tension in debates among English lawyers about 
the principle of unjust enrichment. For a long time there was resistance to 
the idea that such a principle was part of the common law: one judge 
described it as a ‘well-meaning sloppiness of thought,’59 and as late as 1977 
we were told by the House of Lords that a general principle of unjust 
enrichment (as opposed to ‘specific remedies in particular cases’) is not 
recognized in English law.60 These sceptics were not opposed to some of the 
doctrines now subsumed under this heading (such as the doctrine that the 
recipient of a mistaken payment ought to give it up), but rather to the 
introduction of a category, which despite good intentions, was not 
sufficiently constraining. In terms of the present discussion the perceived 
danger was that unjust enrichment’s doctrinal open-endedness would bring 
down the separation of law from politics. It is exactly for this reason, 
therefore, that the defenders of unjust enrichment have been so insistent 
that unjust enrichment, despite appearances, has little to do with justice, and 
why they tried to show just how much the law has shed its older loose and 
vague formulations to become a doctrinally respectable area in which ‘the 
judges simply ask themselves “is this enrichment unjust?”’, and this question 
is determined as ‘a matter of law’.61 Many of the seemingly purely doctrinal 
debates in this area of law are, in part, a reflection of this tension between 
the desire to keep the doctrine loose enough to serve the role of solving 
problems in other areas of law but not too loose as to undermine its doctrinal 
respectability.  
If I am right about this, then it is not difficult to see why restitution law 
(and the principle against unjust enrichment) played a much more 
significant role within English (and Commonwealth) law than it has in 
American law in the last fifty or so years. The primary motivation for unjust 
enrichment law was a felt need to circumvent various doctrines that were 
thought to lead to unjust results but were also considered too entrenched to 
eliminate. Unjust enrichment was new and thus sufficiently malleable, and it 
was perhaps inherently somewhat looser than other areas of law. It could be 
                                                     
59
 Holt v Markham [1923] 1 KB 504 at 513, CA; c.f. Baylis v. Bishop of London 
[1913] 1 Ch 127 at 140, C.A. (criticizing the appeal to equitable doctrines grounded 
in ‘vague jurisprudence which is sometimes styled “justice as between man and 
man.”’). 
60
 Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95 at 104, HL (Eng).  
61






applied to a much broader range of situations than either tort or contract. 
And with sufficient doctrinal work it was considered sufficiently ‘legal’ to 
assuage fears of the politicization of private law.62 
The American story is different. To the extent that American courts and 
academics were still trying to maintain the separation of law from politics, 
they still had some use for restitution, although even here they were probably 
less concerned with precedent or doctrinal constraints than their English 
counterparts. (It is therefore not a coincidence that this doctrinal innovation 
was imported into Commonwealth law from the United States.) But as the 
idea of law being separate from politics was largely abandoned, so was the 
interest in the reasoned elaboration of doctrine. American courts still 
continued to base their judgments on traditional doctrinal materials (even 
though they have always been much more sympathetic to academic work 
than English courts),63 but they did so while openly acknowledging the 
underlying normative considerations at stake, and they showed greater 
willingness to abandon old doctrines that did not seem fitting to changing 
times. Thus, for instance, in the U.S. the solution to the problem of the 
battle of the forms mentioned above was achieved by changing the rules on 
offer and acceptance and was classified as part of contract law. The famous 
section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code maintains that under 
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certain conditions a contract may be formed even when the acceptance is in 
a form that introduces changes to the offer. Similar ideas were adopted long 
before by the courts.64 And even if courts had to base their judgments on 
doctrine, there was no reason for academics to constrain themselves in this 
way. American legal academics have come to see themselves as engaged in 
normative debates on what the law should be, and on these matters doctrine 
has come to be perceived as a somewhat sinister means of obscuring the real 
(normative, political) issues at stake. It was thus difficult to see how 
engaging in doctrinal scholarship could provide real help in addressing the 
issues the courts face.65  
All this only makes the question posed in the beginning even more 
pertinent. If American law is much more concerned with engaging people 
with moral and political questions, why did American academic lawyers not 
turn to normative, ‘theoretical’ work on unjust enrichment in the way they 
did with contract or tort law? The answer should by now be clear: unjust 
enrichment law was a product of the particular need to solve legal problems 
in a particular way. It was a solution to an essentially legal problem, but those 
who were no hampered by this problem, had relatively little need for it. If it 
is accepted that a main role of unjust enrichment law was to solve problems 
in other areas of law, the American lawyer’s response would more likely have 
been: let’s change the original law. Why add a layer of doctrinal complexity, 
when the source of the problem can be removed more directly? Even if the 
courts sometimes marched to a similar beat as their Commonwealth 
counterparts,66 for academics, there was simply no intellectual problem to 
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solve. If some doctrines pose a problem, well, ‘Off with their heads!’ At the 
higher level of theoretical abstraction, unjust enrichment could not add 
much to the discussion on the appropriate boundaries of property rights, on 
what is considered a ‘taking,’ on the normative implications of autonomy, 
fairness, or efficiency, but by and large the principle of unjust enrichment 
was not perceived as helpful in addressing them. In other words, the reason 
there was relatively little non-doctrinal unjust enrichment scholarship was 
that it was not perceived to have much non-doctrinal intellectual meat.  
(b) The Place of Legal Realism 
Superficially, all this fits the realist story told by Saiman and Langbein. Many 
of the realists denounced the kind of conceptualism that is a token of 
doctrinal scholarship. Felix Cohen, most famously, scathingly attacked the 
idea that there is some conceptual truth to be discovered about legal 
questions.67 ‘Title’ was one of his examples of ‘legal nonsense,’ a view he 
shared with Karl Llewellyn who thought legal title was a ‘mystical’ idea.68 
Less famously, but just as importantly, Cohen attacked the idea that legal 
criticism is in some sense based on logic: the only significant basis for legal 
criticism, he said, was that the law was morally wrong.69 Such a view often 
translates to contempt towards what is sometimes called ‘juridical reason,’ 
especially if one believes that legal doctrine alone cannot provide a very 
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strong constraint on a judge’s ability to get to the outcome she wants. This, 
famously, is also something that many legal realists believed.70  
In truth, however, the story is more complex, because to the extent that 
legal doctrine is nowadays less important in the United States than in 
England, putting the blame (or the praise) on the realists ignores the 
background described above about law and politics. As I see it, the realist 
attack on legal concepts is grounded in a particular view about the 
relationship between law and politics. It is grounded either in rejection of the 
view that legal rules are there to keep lawyers and political considerations 
apart, or in the view that if that is the aim of legal rules, they fail miserably in 
this task. On this point, I believe, the legal realists, or more precisely their 
success and lasting influence in the United States, are the effect, not the 
cause. Put differently, to invoke the legal realists’ dislike for doctrinal 
scholarship as the reason for American lawyers’ lack of interest in 
contemporary doctrinal work on restitution is not to offer an answer to the 
question, but merely to restate it. What must be explained are the origins of 
legal realism, and, especially in a comparative context, why its disparate 
impact in different jurisdictions. The question is not, or not only, why legal 
realism emerged in the United States and not elsewhere. The answer to this 
question involves various intertwining factors, having to do with the earlier 
professionalization of American universities, the early emergence of the 
American law school as an integral part of the university system, and a ‘revolt 
against formalism’71 that crossed disciplinary boundaries in American 
universities at the time. But we should not forget that broadly similar realist 
ideas emerged in many countries around the same time: in France François 
Gény and Léon Duguit expressed such views, in Germany there was Jhering 
and later the ‘free law’ movement,72 and in Scandinavia there was a parallel 
‘realist’ movement to the American one.73 In fact, even England had its small 
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band of ‘legal realists’ working around the same period that the American 
legal realists came to prominence.74  
The significant question is why despite all this, realist ideas have had 
much greater staying power in the United States, where they have taken deep 
root and have affected the way law is taught, researched and conceived, but 
have had much weaker impact elsewhere. In the context of this essay the 
interesting question is why, even after being shown the American example, 
most English scholars remained not just unenthusiastic, but often openly 
hostile to legal realism. Such questions obviously do not lend themselves to a 
single, simple answer, but I believe an important ingredient in the answer has 
to do with the different perceptions already existing (or emerging) at the time 
on the respective roles of and relationships between law and politics in the 
American and English (or British) political traditions.75 Realist ideas caught 
on in the United States because the periods prior to their emergence saw 
more overt ties between law and politics, especially, but not exclusively, in 
constitutional law. While it is true that on the surface most legal realists 
seemed relatively unconcerned with the question of the relationship between 
law and politics and with the impact of judges’ political opinions on the 
outcome of cases,76 I think it is this background that made realist ideas 
appear a more adequate, and a more honest, description of the law. Then, in 
a kind of feedback loop mechanism, legal realism may have made the 
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connection between law and politics even more pronounced, until it was 
made explicit by scholars writing a generation later.77  
In one sense this claim will not come as news to lawyers: the differences 
between the two countries in matters like parliamentary sovereignty, judicial 
review, judicial engagement in politically-sensitive matters and so on are all 
too obvious to ignore. But acknowledgement of these differences is usually 
limited to public law. The point emerging from my account is that this is a 
mistake. They are relevant to private law, because in a fundamental way they 
are relevant to the very understanding of what counts as private law, and 
perhaps more importantly to the question why something counts as private 
law. In fact, the very distinction between private law and public law should 
be understood as a product of the English view on the relationship between 
law and politics, not as its source. By contrast, the very different conception 
of the relationship between law and politics which explains why American 
lawyers have long considered the distinction between private and public law 
suspect.78  
I might still be challenged that what looks like a great divide is only a 
mirage, a reflection of the particular (or peculiar) interests of American 
academic lawyers. According to this view on both sides of the Atlantic lawyers 
rely on restitutionary ideas in roughly equal measure, but it is American legal 
academics’ lack of interest in doctrinal questions that obscures the rather 
similar state of the law.79 There are several responses to this suggestion. First, 
even if it is entirely true, we are still left with a puzzle—although perhaps a 
less significant one—and that is why American academic lawyers are 
relatively uninterested in writing on this area of law as opposed to their 
English and Commonwealth counterparts. Second, despite the greater divide 
between legal practice and academic law in the United States, there is an 
inevitable connection between them. Those who end up in legal practice get 
their first legal training in law school, and if one does not encounter unjust 
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enrichment there, unjust enrichment may just not be part of the conceptual 
toolbox she uses later in practice. Third and most important, virtually all of 
those who have considered the U.S.–Commonwealth divide on unjust 
enrichment have concluded that the differences are found not only in the 
law reviews, but also in the law reports.  
(c) Where Has American Law Seen Developments in 
Restitution? 
To further develop the point just made, I will return now to a matter that has 
so far has only been briefly alluded to, but which I think fits the story told 
here very well, and that is that there is actually some American scholarship 
that invokes restitutionary ideas, but this work is very different from the 
English and Commonwealth doctrinal work on unjust enrichment. For this 
we need to distinguish between a cause of action in unjust enrichment and 
restitutionary (gain-based) remedies. As a cause of action unjust enrichment 
is discussed by American lawyers primarily in those areas in which it is 
thought that existing legal doctrine contains a gap thought incapable of 
addressing an existing injustice. To put the matter in somewhat rough terms, 
whereas in English law unjust enrichment has been developed as a distinctly 
legal supplement for solving problems with existing doctrines in other areas 
of law that lawyers felt incapable of solving within those areas of law, for 
American lawyers the main use for restitutionary ideas has been the 
development of new grounds for liability where none existed before. Claims 
for reparation for historical wrongs are a primary example.80 Central to this 
understanding of unjust enrichment is the view that the ‘soul of unjust 
enrichment … includes flexibility, creativity, justice and morality 
underpinnings, and discretion.’81 It should not come as a surprise that 
doctrinal English lawyers who relied on restitution primarily for correcting 
problems with existing doctrines in other parts of private law have not been 
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enthusiastic about extending restitution in that direction.82 One such critic 
has even contrasted doctrinal scholars’ commitment to the ‘principle of 
unjust enrichment’ with the ‘politics’ that underlies the restitutionary ideas 
he found in the United States.83  
The other area where we have seen some American interest is the 
question of restitution as a remedy, and this too is consistent with the view I 
outlined above. Within the approach favoured by Commonwealth lawyers, 
there is a conceptual connection between particular types of claim and 
particular remedies, and as a result the area of remedies has remained 
relatively undeveloped. In American law, there was a reversal of roles. The 
content of one’s rights (or, as they became more neutrally to be called, 
‘entitlements’) has come to be seen as determined by the remedies one could 
get for their violation. This led academic lawyers to explore the question of 
remedies at levels of sophistication unmatched by (and largely unknown to) 
Commonwealth lawyers.84 And it is here that the possibility of a remedy 
based on the defendant’s gain rather than the plaintiff’s loss (as opposed to 
the question whether there is a distinct domain of ‘unjust enrichment’), has 
attracted some attention. But this attention is likely to disappoint friends of 
unjust enrichment: the question of whether there is room for gain-based 
remedies is one that can be raised alongside a broad range of remedies that 
could all be attached to different claims, whether these are classified as 
belonging to contract, torts, patent violation, ‘unjust enrichment,’ or 
anything else. Therefore, the sort of arguments utilized in deciding whether 
to award or withhold such remedies are analyzed largely in consequentialist 
terms and touch on considerations that English proponents of unjust 
enrichment are likely to consider alien to the subject.85  
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Saiman notices this point and ascribes this break between rights and 
remedies to legal realism.86 Loosely speaking, the connection is correct, 
although once again the picture is more complex.87 Here too I think a more 
complete explanation has to include the main thesis of this essay about the 
location of law with regard to politics. The view that sees a conceptual 
connection between certain legal rights and certain legal remedies is 
apolitical to the extent that it denies that available legal remedies should be 
determined according to normative judgments external to legal concepts. 
Birks provided a clear statement of this view in the context of considering the 
issue of priority among creditors in insolvency. He rejected the view that this 
matter should be determined by an attempt at assessing which solution 
would lead to better consequences. As he put it, ‘[f]or my part I find it 
difficult to say who deserves to suffer or which groups deserve to suffer more 
than others. Giving an answer to changing the answer already given seems to 
be precisely the kind of issue which has to be left to the legislature.’88 These are 
the sort of considerations that a political body should take, and as such they 
are beyond the remit of legal argument. According to the approach Birks 
favoured ‘the business of the lawyer can only be to say with as much 
precision as possible on what facts proprietary interests arise.’89 This view 
makes much sense as both a statement of the separateness of law and 
politics, and as a strategy for keeping them like that.  
Understanding rights in terms of remedies—understanding legal 
entitlements as the sum total of the remedies they can give rise to—is easier 
to accept when law is understood in broadly political terms. On this view the 
appropriate remedy is not determined by its ‘form,’ by correct location of the 
event in question on the legal ‘map.’ Instead, legal rights are thought of as 
nothing more than entitlements to certain legal protections, and the limits of 
those legal protections are determined by political considerations that legal 
doctrine cannot provide. This does not necessarily mean that judges will 
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always undertake a detailed cost-benefit analysis in search of the optimal 
remedy in every individual case. They may not have the means or data to do 
that (and it is here that legal scholars may come to their aid); but it does 
mean that there is no principled argument against, say, taking deterrence 
considerations into account when deciding whether to award restitutionary 
remedies or not, and it does mean that in practice, remedies will be subject 
to the impact of political argument unmediated by legal form. From a 
doctrinal perspective this is conceptual confusion and a dangerous 
development in that it undermines the division between law and politics. 
From the opposite perspective, legal categories are tools to be used for the 
sake of promoting normative goals. This is precisely the approach one finds 
much more often among American restitution scholars and American 
courts.90  
(d) A Note on the Debates among Restitution Lawyers 
The argument developed above was mainly focused on the difference in 
modern attitudes to restitution in England (and to varying degrees the rest of 
the Commonwealth) and the United States; but I think it can also help us 
understand existing debates among English (and Commonwealth) 
restitution scholars. Those are often presented as debates about the ‘nature’ 
of restitution or of the common law. On one side stand those who adopt the 
broadly Birksian position, who insist on the reality of unjust enrichment, and 
on the other stand the unjust enrichment sceptics, some of whom doubt 
whether this area unjust enrichment law even exists. Consider, once again, 
the case of mistaken payment. The question—whether the recipient should 
give up the money received—is simple, as is the legal outcome. The 
competing explanations offered as to why are, nonetheless, very different, 
although they too are not very difficult to understand. Where, then, does all 
the disagreement come from?  
One characteristic aspect of the debate, at times amusing but more often 
frustrating, is the disparity in the kinds of arguments used and the sources 
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used to substantiate them. Proponents of the proprietary approach often 
invoke broadly moral and political considerations; their respondents then 
answer by appealing to cases.91 Each side finds the other’s way of arguing for 
their outcome puzzling. This difference becomes less puzzling once it is 
realized that the two sides to the debate are committed to different views on 
the proper way of developing and improving the law. I am confident that if 
the matter were to be examined empirically, it would be found that there is 
strong correlation between those who think that unjust enrichment is a real 
legal category and the view that the development of law must be based on 
the analysis and elaboration of legal materials, whereas those who are critical 
of unjust enrichment tend to the view that law must primarily be explained 
and justified by appeal to external moral standards. For those in the second 
group the fact that one can find cases that mention unjust enrichment is 
largely irrelevant to the question whether unjust enrichment ‘exists.’ In 
considering the structure of the law our primary consideration is matching 
the law not with doctrine, but with moral and political principles. From this 
perspective, the principle of unjust enrichment appears largely superfluous. 
So here we have one important moral for those engaged in the debates 
on the status of unjust enrichment: until you agree on the question of law 
and politics, the likelihood of one side adducing arguments that the other is 
likely to find potentially convincing, or even relevant—the likelihood, in 
other words, of genuine debate—is small indeed. Since it is unlikely that an 
answer to this question will be forthcoming any time soon, the question of 
the ‘nature’ of unjust enrichment is likely to remain equally contested. 
Conclusion 
In most comparative discussions English and American law are still treated as 
belonging to one ‘family,’ one legal tradition, one that in fact is quite often 
called the ‘Anglo-American’ legal tradition. In some respects no doubt the 
classification is still valid and valuable, but on some issues it can be 
misleading. The question considered in this essay is one of those. The 
explanation offered here for their divergence on unjust enrichment is that 
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answering this question requires not simply stating that doctrinal scholarship 
has become much less popular in the U.S. than in England, but rather 
explaining why this happened. The answer offered here is, first, that largely 
through the work of doctrinal scholars restitution law has come to occupy in 
English law the role of resolving problems in areas in which legal doctrine 
seemed to lead to unjust results but was thought too deeply entrenched for 
change. It then argued that such ossification of doctrine was possible because 
of a particular conception of the common law as non-political, one that in 
turn was believed to impose certain limits on the sort and scope of legal 
change courts can bring about. The rise of unjust enrichment in English law 
was, then, explained as a solution to an internal legal problem that is the 
result of the normative foundations of English law and its conceptualization 
in relation to politics. It is this conceptualization that has been largely 
abandoned in the United States, and with its demise the need for developing 
unjust enrichment as a distinct legal category declined as well. This fact itself 
has a complex relationship with legal realism, but my argument has sought to 
show that it cannot be fully explained as caused by legal realism; rather, at 
least to some extent it predates it and is better understood as one of the 
causes of legal realism, or rather of its lasting success.  
The essay has also touched on more abstract questions, of which I wish 
to highlight two. One is the question of the relationship between law and 
politics. It should be clear that I reject the view that these two domains are as 
a conceptual matter separate just as much as I reject the view that as a 
conceptual matter they are tied. Rather, as I have sought to show my view is 
that there are various ways of understanding their relationship resulting in 
different understandings of what law is. The other is the divide that exists in 
legal philosophy between the search for what is called, misleadingly I think, 
‘the nature of law’ on the one hand, and the theoretical questions relating to 
particular areas of law on the other hand. The former inquiry is typically 
presented as conceptual and morally neutral whereas the latter as normative, 
and as such the two seem to be relatively independent of each other. I reject 
this this divide, because I believe both should be understood as part of one 
political inquiry. As the present essay has shown normative choices at the 
level of the ‘nature’ of law have normative implications on what particular 
areas of law look like.  
